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Community theory has taken a decisively Heideggerian turn in recent times.
Out of the ashes of human subjectivity, both separate and collective,
hermeneutical phenomenology rises majestically with the promise of better
things to come. In the European tradition, at least, the reign of the individual
has run its course, while the vacuum left after the demise of communism
seems unlikely to be filled with a viable alternative form of sociality for some
time to come. A pre-War philosopher of the meaning of Being, which he him-
self called “the most universal and the emptiest of questions” (Heidegger 63),
Heidegger is not the obvious candidate to fill the gap. The existential analytic
of Dasein is neither political nor ethical (nor, for that matter, anthropological,
sociological or psychological) but something purely ontological rather nebu-
lously presupposed by all these disciplines. What is at stake, however, is the
radical re-postulation of what subjectivity itself might entail if the ground is
cleared of the metaphysics of the Cartesian cogito sum, one of the implications
of which is that Being can no longer be conceived in isolation, but must be
understood in advance as a mode of “Being-with” others (Mitsein). Although
the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the autonomous subject has been
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implicit in radical philosophy for at least a century now, its uses for political
theory have remained elusive. Heidegger’s attention to Mitsein as an onto-
logical structure of Dasein was limited to a short chapter in Being and Time,
and his own late Nazism was hardly an encouragement to any would-be fol-
lowers. Until recently, that is, when a different political climate has favored
a return to his work with an eye to its radical potential for theories of com-
munity in a post-individualistic age.
Community, in this new sense, is not to be understood in some idealized
form as a collective bonding or property collectively owned. In the tradition
followed by the authors reviewed here, community is better understood nega-
tively—as a “common non-belonging” (Esposito 7) or exposure to loss de-
pendent upon the “expropriation” of individual essence. To this extent, it differs
from Marxism, which posits an essence of human nature in community based
on production, as well as from the American model of neo-communitarianism.
What needs to be recognized, these authors argue, is the impossibility of com-
munion or immanence in a post-metaphysical world, indeed the end of the
metaphysics of subjectivity altogether, with our exposure to alterity as the cor-
nerstone of Being. This approach to alterity does not mean the recognition of
self in the other, which is after all part of the humanist tradition. Rather, it en-
tails the very experience of the alterity of the other, a kind of infinite displace-
ment recalling Lacan’s critique of American ego psychology for the way it re-
fuses the lack (self-division) in the subject. Like Lacan, these authors follow
Heidegger in deploring “the lack of the lack,” which results in a “nihilism” in
human relationships of the sort that led Europe to the totalitarian disasters of
the last century. To put it in the terms used by Blanchot, whose  La commau-
nauté inavouable (1983; The Unavowable Community, 1988) foreshadowed
much of what was to come, we relate to each other through our common alter-
ity and finitude, ultimately our shared exposure to death. If the phantom of the
lost community, community as retrospective nostalgia, has haunted Western
culture since at least Homer’s Odyssey, the time has come to recognize loss as
constitutive of community itself, with exposure to our common finitude offer-
ing the opportunity to encounter the other outside the servitude of selfhood. 
The work of Agamben, Nancy, Esposito and others has brought with it a
bracing new vocabulary with a tendency, like Heidegger’s, to invest everyday
or even banal terms with ontological significance. Giorgio Agamben’s
favourite term is “whatever” (qualunque), which carries with it some of the
shrug-of-the-shoulders indifference to (traditional notions of) significance
along with a great deal more. “Whatever” in the new sense means what is nei-
ther individual nor generic, neither particular nor general, that which exposes
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and liberates us from the “false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose be-
tween the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal”
(Agamben, Coming Community 1). Being is exposed in all its singularity, “as
such,” “sic,” reclaimed from having this or that property identifying it as be-
longing to this or that set (being black, being French, being Muslim). The an-
tinomy of the individual and the universal which underlies Western philosophy,
Agamben explains, has its origin in language. The word “tree,” for example,
transforms singularities into members of a class or set (the tree) that may at
times take the form of singularity (a tree, this particular tree). Returning to me-
dieval philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus), Agamben demonstrates
how the human word is neither common (language) nor the communication
of what is “proper” (one’s own) — just as the human face is neither the indi-
viduation of a generic facies nor the universalization of singular traits. Rather,
it is “whatever face,” in which what belongs to common nature and what is
proper are absolutely indifferent or indistinguishable. The notion of the indi-
vidual’s unsubstitutability, he argues, is a “hypocritical fiction” (24). “Manner”
is another newly-invested term brought into service in Agamben’s attempt to
break up the binary of genus and species. “Maneries,” again an inheritance
from the medieval “dispute of the universals,” expresses the idea of the “man-
ner of things” (being in this or that mode)—“being in its rising forth,” neither
an essence nor an existence, but a Heideggerian “being that is its mode of
being,” both singular and multiple, valid for all (28). What Agamben is striving
for is a formulation of what he calls exemplary or multiple singularity: “The
example is only the being of that of which it is the example; but this being
does not belong to it, it is perfectly common” (29). The multiple common
place, the community as we must come to understand it, therefore, is nothing
but the coming to itself of each of the singularities that constitute it. 
Readers of Agamben’s most well-known work, Homo Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life (first published in Italian in 1995, five years after The
Coming Community), will recognize many of these points: the Foucauldian
critique of modern Western techniques of subjective individualization, the
analysis of the way the political has been transformed into the biopolitical,
opening the way for totalitarianism, the growing dissociation of birth (bare
life, zoe) from the nation-state. In a later book, L’aperto: L’uomo e l’animale
(The Open: Man and Animal) (2002), he has formulated the question in terms
of the recent debate about the man-animal relation.1 Since World War I, he
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1. See, for example, Jacques Derrida’s L’animal qui donc je suis (2006; The Animal that
Therefore I Am, 2008).
argues here, and particularly now, with the society of the spectacle, when it
has become obvious that European nation-states are no longer capable of tak-
ing on historical tasks, all we have is the “very factical existence of peoples”
(Agamben, The Open 76), bare life in the form of our animality.  With the de-
mise of the “anthropological machine,” “the total humanization of the animal
coincides with a total animalization of man” (77).
Heideggerian ontology and the barest form of bare life are welded to-
gether at the end of Agamben’s Coming Community when he asks: 
What could be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being
whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging
(being red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple ab-
sence of conditions (a negative community, such as that recently pro-
posed in France by Maurice Blanchot), but by belonging itself? (85)
To exist is to co-belong with others, purely and simply, without representable
identity. The State must be dissociated from any idea of a social bond (and
here Agamben shares Alain Badiou’s definition of the State as an un-binding).
Humanity, in the form of the planetary petty bourgeoisie, can either be seen
as moving towards its own destruction, or as being offered a new opportunity,
unheard of before in history:
If instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already
improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to suc-
ceed . . . in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an
individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and
absolutely exposed singularity—if humans could, that is, not be-thus
in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular
exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time enter into
a community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a
communication without the incommunicable.
Selecting in the new planetary humanity those characteristics
that allow for its survival, removing the thin diaphragm that separates
bad mediatized advertising from the perfect exteriority that commu-
nicates only itself—that is the political task of our generation. (65)
Jean-Luc Nancy has been at the forefront of this attempt to re-define com-
munity over the past three decades, with a list of books whose titles tell the
story: Le partage des voix (1982; “Sharing Voices,” 1989), La commaunauté
désoeuvrée (1986; The Inoperative Community, 1991), (co-edited) Who
Comes After the Subject? (1991), Être singulier pluriel (1996; Being Singular
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Plural, 2000), and many others. Combining Althusser on interpellation, Lacan
on lack and Derridean deconstruction, Nancy’s work ponders the way a
community without subjects is one where the plural liberates (or shares) the
singular and vice versa. Like Agamben, he thinks through Heidegger’s Mitsein
in relation to the human face. The obvious but not always recognized point
about the face, he argues, is what it’s there for: to face not ourselves but others.
This “archi-original impossibility of Narcissus,” however, is what opens
straight onto “the possibility of the political” (Nancy, Inoperative Community
xxxviii). 
A new politics necessarily challenges the multi-culturalism of post-
modernity for its valorization of the immanence or essence of different faces,
voices, gestures and attitudes. Being Singular Plural, written in 1995, begins
with a long list of places in the world disfigured by bloody conflicts among
different identities, the numbers of refugees rising all the time, and asks
whether “we” means anything any longer. Something very different from “this
autistic multiplicity” is needed if we are to break up this violent relatedness,
as “we have not even begun to discover what it is to be many” (Being Sin-
gular Plural xiii-xiv).
Again, part of the difficulty stems from language, which is always an ad-
dress simultaneously to both “me” and “us” (the world, history, people,
things). The address is singular, but the other that demands our response (com-
munication) is plural (community). We might demur that the logic of this
“with,” saying “being-with-one another,” often requires heavy-handed syntax,
and Nancy would agree (xvi). On the other hand, it gives language the special
responsibility of defining community in its present-day form, one that for him
involves interrupting the sort of totalizing myths of community on which
Nazism was founded. Following Bataille and Blanchot, Nancy attempts to re-
theorize the significance of myth for a post-fascist age. The essay “Eulogy
for the Mêlée” in Being Singular Plural ends with a distinction which makes
clear what he has in mind. Western culture has traditionally valorized myth
(the Homeric “mythos”), which “is the infinite presupposition of its own iden-
tity and authenticity” (158). On the contrary writing (literature), or rather “leg-
end,” from legendum est (“this is to be read”), is that which offers itself to
each singularity who reads it (assuming we inhabit a readers’ world). The to-
tality that would fulfill community requires constant interruption. If, in mythic
mode, I say “Aphrodite” or “France,” this inscription of a proper name is a
promise of presence or identity in advance. But “France” can only be inscribed
through what is shared, in an infinite multiplicity of ways, by each French
man or woman in their particularity. This inscription, what Nancy has also
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rather clumsily called “literary communism,” implicates writing directly with
the political; as the site of our being-in-common, writing has the task of com-
municating an infinite resource of common and singular meanings—not some
appeal to an impossible mythic Logos of shared community but rather the in-
scription of this very impossibility.
On the basis of his view of writing as the sharing of voices, Nancy has
helped himself liberally, as it may have been noticed, to the voice of Derrida.
(The same could be said of all these writers’ use of Heidegger. Although only
a shadow in their main texts, he appears repeatedly in the notes, in one of
which, for example, Nancy confesses that he feels called upon to re-write
Being and Time in order to correct the German phenomenologist’s failure to
highlight and centralize the concept of Mitsein [Being Singular Plural
204n81].)2 Derrida represents a daunting presence for any post-Heideggerian
theorist of community of the late twentieth  and early twenty-first century. He
himself, however, saw it the other way round, with Bataille, Blanchot and
Nancy as the providers. Quoting Bataille’s notion of the “community of those
without community” in Politique de l’amitié (1994; The Politics of Friend-
ship, 1997), Derrida refers to these predecessors as “among those that count
the most for me today,” “thinkers and texts to which I am bound without ever
being their equal” (Derrida 47n15). The un-binding of a literary community
without community, it seems, may among other things help alleviate the anx-
iety of influence. These writers do indeed share a substantial body of thought:
the deconstruction of logo-phonocentrism, the insistence on the necessity of
the other at the heart of the cogito,3 and the replacement of immanence with
propinquity (not being-in-community but being-with-others). The emphasis,
however, is always away from any hint of solidarity or fraternity, towards a
phrase attributed to Aristotle which Derrida returns to repeatedly: “O my
friends, there is no friend” (Derrida xvii). 
The latest contribution to this Franco-Italian debate, Roberto Esposito’s
Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community, which has just been
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2. “It is necessary to re-write Being and Time: this is not a ridiculous pretension, and it is
not ‘mine’; it is the necessity of all the major works, insofar as they are ours. One can
guess without much trouble that this necessity also belongs to the stakes of a political
rewriting” (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 204n81).
3. Derrida characteristically uses Cartesian terms to turn the cogito on its head: “I think,
therefore I am the other; I think, therefore I need the other (in order to think); I think,
therefore the possibility of friendship is lodged in the movement of my thought in so
far as it demands, calls for, desires the other, the necessity of the other, the cause of the
other at the heart of the cogito” (Politics of Friendship 224).
translated into English, expresses an “unpayable debt,” in particular, to Nancy
(Esposito 151n1). Debts and gifts are in fact at the heart of the matter for Es-
posito. The word “communitas,” he argues, must be understood literally in
terms of the Latin munus-muneris (gift)—from which we derive English
words such as remuneration, munificence, municipal, etc. The specificity of
munus, in contrast to the more general donum, lies in its obligatory character;
once you have accepted the munus, an obligation has been created to exchange
it in terms of goods or services, thus (potentially) releasing yourself from ob-
ligation. A present (donum) is unilateral, doesn’t require an equal return,
whereas “although produced by a benefit that was previously received, the
munus indicates only the gift that one gives, not what one receives. All of the
munus is projected onto the transitive act of giving” (Esposito 5). Community,
therefore, is better understood as loss in the sense of the perpetual and oblig-
atory act of giving others what you can’t keep to yourself and of which you’ve
never been the owner anyway:
According to the originary valence of the concept of community,
what the members of a community share, based upon the complex
and profound meaning of munus, is rather an expropriation of their
own essence, which isn’t limited to their “having” but one that in-
volves and affects their own “being subjects.”  . . . [this discourse
takes us] from the more traditional terrain of anthropology to that
more radical terrain of ontology; . . . the community isn’t joined to
an addition but to a subtraction of subjectivity, by which I mean that
its members are no longer identical with themselves but are consti-
tutively exposed to a propensity that forces them to open their own
individual boundaries in order to appear as what is “outside” them-
selves. (138)
Renouncing subjectivity (our “most proper property”), exposing ourselves to
the risk of losing protective individual borders, makes us all “givers to” in as
much as we are “given by” in a circuit of mutual gift exchange (5-7).
Central to Esposito’s project is the insertion of munus back into “the mu-
nicipal” as well as the deconstruction of the distinction between private and
public which lies at the heart of modernity. To this end his book offers a sys-
tematic and illuminating summary of the theories from Hobbes to Bataille
which have laid the foundations for the idea of “im-munization” (defined as
the emptying out of the “com-mune” as reciprocity and mutuality). Hobbes
rejected Aristotle’s view of the natural sociality of man and like Freud as-
sumed a primary aggressivity which precludes any community other than one
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based on fear. What humans have in common, he said, is their capacity to be
killed. Knowing this, we hand over our rights to a third party, the sovereign,
in a gesture of unconditional obedience; the political is marked by an originary
guilt that can be atoned for only by introjecting that guilt in renunciation and
sacrifice.  For Rousseau, however, Hobbes’s man as all-devouring wolf is a
product of civilization. His own research into the essence of human nature led
him to the paradigm of the self-sufficient individual. “I am whole, complete
where I am,” he writes in 1767; “in me, with me, for me” (Esposito 57-58), a
philosophy that underlies romantic theories right up to contemporary Amer-
ican communitarianism (e.g. Charles Taylor’s Sources of Self: The Making of
the Modern Identity [1989] or Multiculturalism and the “Politics of Recog-
nition” [1992]). This view, argues Esposito, is posited on the doomed attempt
to isolate the man of nature from his social-cultural context (the hand, after
all, is already a tool). Rousseau’s emphasis on the originarity of solitude,
therefore, must ultimately be regarded as a reaction against the absence of
community. Or, put in Derridian terms, according to the logic of the supple-
ment the attempt to define positively the origin (“natural man”) contains
within it its own denaturalization. Notwithstanding the contradiction that sub-
tracts community from itself, Esposito concludes, “Rousseau’s work consti-
tutes the first demand of the community [munus] as our own truth” (49).
In the three remaining chapters (on Kant, Heidegger and Bataille)
Esposito continues to trace the progress in radical modernity of the desubjec-
tification of the ego, the view that what humans really share is the impossi-
bility of community (as inter-subjectivity or organic whole). Kant never saw
community in Hegelian-Marxian terms as a reappropriation by humans of
their own essence; essence for him is always a debt or lack, by which history
is preceded. In being subjected to the law, the subject is subtracted from self-
consistency. Hannah Arendt, with whom Esposito is often in dialogue in this
book, adapted the Kantian community of the law to fit the post-War climate,
emphasizing the reciprocal difference by which community is crossed and
constituted (what Kant called “respect” as opposed to “love”). As Arendt
writes in The Human Condition (1958): “To live together in the world means
essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as
a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-
between, relates and separates men at the same time” (qtd. in Esposito 79). It
is a haunting image, one of community whittled down to the minimum in re-
sponse to the extravagances of totalitarian fullness and fusion (“fatherland,”
“brotherhood”) but at the same time one which might start humanity off again
in a less self-destructive direction.
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To Habermas’s hypothesis of the community of communication in a
globally networked world Esposito opposes a Bataillean hermeneutic of
being-towards-death which places us always at the limit. Communication,
Bataille wrote in On Nietzsche (1945), “cannot proceed from one full and in-
tact individual to another. It requires individuals whose separate existence in
themselves is risked, placed at the limit of death and nothingness” (qtd. in
Esposito 145-46). In the loneliness of our common emptiness, in sharing the
experience of what can’t be experienced (death), we escape the greater danger,
the “nihilism” of being sealed off in ourselves. Whether in the “openness” of
our common animality (Bataille, Derrida, Agamben) or simply the avoidance
of the crises of the paradigm of the state or the spread of multi-cultural con-
flicts, the question remains: what is to-come after the big political experiments
of the twentieth century, and at a time of profound change in culture or civi-
lization productive of what some see as new forms of humanity itself?
Another way of putting all this is in terms of the debates around the con-
cept of democracy to which these writers have also been contributing re-
cently.4 In a book entitled Démocratie dans quel état? (2009), which includes
presentations by both Nancy and Agamben (along with Alain Badiou, Jacques
Rancière, Slavoj Žižek and others), Plato is invoked in the exploration of the
inherent contradictions in the term, as well as its radical potential. For Badiou,
the “interminable twilight” of democracy today, in the form of parliamentary
capitalism, continues to call up its original Platonic sense of the existence of
the people conceived as power over themselves—by which is meant not a ho-
mogeneous “life of the people,” but rather the “communisms” which are today
being gradually invented (Agamben et. al. 25). For Žižek, never far away
when a big debate is at hand, the fetish of democracy in the West today,
whereby sheltering behind the ballot box becomes a means of avoiding
protest against injustice, leads inevitably to a “utilitarian, pragmatic inertia”
(Agamben et. al. 146). The critique of the democratic form, he agrees with
Badiou, is the truly risky philosophical imperative today, the one that poses
problems altogether more difficult than acknowledging the extent of the in-
justices of global capitalism (Badiou and Žižek 90). For Žižek the question is
not so much whether a state is democratic or not, but rather the form of power
wielded by its sovereign. After all, it was as a result of more or less free elec-
tions that Hitler came to power. The external figure of the sovereign is integral
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4. Some of them, like Jacques Rancière, begin from the assumption behind Churchill’s
famous quip that democracy is the worst form of government, apart from all the others
that have been tried (Agamben et. al. 96).
to any political structure—just as the analyst is integral to the analytic relation
(there is no such thing as self-analysis). So in speaking of power, it’s less a
question of knowing whether it is democratically legitimate or not than one
of understanding the character of the “totalitarian excess” associated with the
leader (Agamben et. al. 146).
The common celebration of democracy as that which fosters individual
liberty may well be heading towards extinction. Whether singular plurality
proves to be a more just and effective foundation for community remains to
be seen. Indeed, the material conditions for such a politics remain vague—
although here, it could be added, these authors are in good company, as Plato’s
ideal of the philosophical city has frequently been called utopian. If the col-
lective destiny of human beings is today best defined negatively, or remains
largely to be invented, this soft revolution is nonetheless generating enough
collective energy to do a great deal more than simply raise Heidegger from
the ashes.
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Greece
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